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Abstract. Lorenzen dialogues provide a two-player game formalism that
can characterize a variety of logics: each set S of rules for such a game
determines a set D(S) of formulas for which one of the players (the so-
called Proponent) has a winning strategy, and the set D(S) can coincide
with various logics, such as intuitionistic, classical, modal, connexive, and
relevance logics. But the standard sets of rules employed for these games
are often logically opaque and can involve subtle interactions among
each other. Moreover, D(S) can vary in unexpected ways with S; small
changes in S, even logically well-motivated ones, can make D(S) logically
unusual. We pose the problem of providing a structure theory that could
explain how D(S) varies with S, and in particular, when D(S) is closed
under modus ponens (and thus constitutes at least a minimal kind of
logic).
1 Introduction
Lorenzen dialogue games [12] were offered as an alternative game-theoretic for-
malism for intuitionistic logic (both propositional and first-order). The first
player, Proponent (P), lays down a logical formula and strives to successfully
respond to the assaults of Opponent. The motion of the game is determined by
rules that depend on the structure of a formula appearing in the game (which
is always a subformula or, in the case of a first-order game, an instance of, the
initial formula played by P), as well as by rules that depend less on the form
of the formula at issue but rather concern the global structure of the game and
what kinds of roles can permissibly be played by P and Opponent (who are not
merely dual to one another, as the players often are in other logic games [5]).
Although Felscher’s equivalence theorem cleanly relates winning strategies of
Lorenzen games to intuitionistic validity, the rules for these games are not en-
tirely straightforward and indeed some of them appear to be arbitrary.
Lorenz claimed that Lorenzen’s dialogue games offer a new type of seman-
tics for intuitionistic logic and asserts the equivalence between dialogical validity
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(defined in terms of winning strategies for the P) and intuitionistic derivabil-
ity [10,11]. Lorenz’s proof contained some gaps, and later authors sought to fill
these gaps; a complete proof can be found in [3].
Dialogue games are not restricted to intuitionistic logic. By modifying the
rules of the game, the dialogue approach can also provide a semantics for classical
logic. The dialogical approach can be adapted equally well to capture validity
for other logics, such as paraconsistent, connexive, modal and linear logics [8,14].
All of these extensions of Lorenzen’s and Lorenz’s initial formulation of dialogue
games are achieved by modifying the rules of the game while maintaining the
overall dialogical flavor.
The fact that there is no principled restriction on how the dialogical rules can
be modified naturally raises the question of when the set of S-valid formulas, for
a particular set S of dialogical rules, actually corresponds to a logic. That is, we
are interested in identifying desirable properties of the set of S-valid formulas in
order to give it some logical sensibility. One such desirable property is that the
set be closed under modus ponens: If ϕ and ϕ→ ψ are S-dialogically valid, then
so should ψ be. We propose to call the problem of resolving whether a set S of
rules for dialogue games satisfies this property the composition problem for S.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section introduces dialogue
games and provides a few examples to make the reader familiar with the basic
definitions and notation. Section 3 poses the composition problem. We general-
ize the problem and motivate it from two perspectives of dialogues. Section 4
presents the results of three initial experiments that bear on the composition
problem. Section 4.1 describes a curious dialogical logic called N. Section 4.2
describes a failed (but apparently well-motivated) attempted dialogical charac-
terization of the intermediate logic LQ of weak excluded middle. Section 4.3
takes on the problem of giving a dialogical characterization of stable logic (the
intermediate logic in which the principle ¬¬p→ p holds for atoms p). Section 4.4
motivates the problem of giving independent rulesets and argues that it may be a
useful first step toward solving (instances of) the composition problem. Section 5
concludes and offers a few open problems for consideration.
2 Dialogue games
We largely follow Felscher’s approach to dialogical logic [3]. For an overview of
dialogical logic, see [8].
We work with a propositional language; formulas are built from atoms and
¬, ∨, ∧, and →. In addition to formulas, there are the three so-called symbolic
attack expressions, ?, ∧L, and ∧R, which are distinct from all the formulas and
connectives. Together formulas and symbolic attacks are called statements; they
are what is asserted in a dialogue game.
The rules governing dialogues are divided into two types. Particle rules say
how statements can be attacked and defended depending on their main con-
nective. Structural rules define what sequences of attacks and defenses count as
dialogues. Different logics can be obtained by modifying either set of rules.
Assertion Attack Response
ϕ ∧ ψ ∧L ϕ
∧R ψ
ϕ ∨ ψ ? ϕ or ψ
ϕ → ψ ϕ ψ
¬ϕ ϕ —
Table 1. Particle rules for dialogue games
The standard particle rules are given in Table 1. According to the first
row, there are two possible attacks against a conjunction: The attacker spec-
ifies whether the left or the right conjunct is to be defended, and the defender
then continues the game by asserting the specified conjunct. The second row
says that there is one attack against a disjunction; the defender then chooses
which disjunct to assert. The interpretation of the third row is straightforward.
The fourth row says that there is no way to defend against the attack against a
negation; the only appropriate “defense” against an attack on a negation ¬ϕ is
to continue the game with the new information ϕ.
Further constraints on the development of a dialogue are given by the struc-
tural rules. In this paper we keep the particle rules fixed, but we shall consider
a few variations of the structural rules.
Definition 1. Given a set S of structural rules, an S-dialogue for a formula
ϕ is a dialogue commencing with ϕ that adheres to the rules of S. P wins an
S-dialogue if P made the last move in the dialogue and no moves are available
for O by which the game could be extended.
Remark 1. According to this definition, if the dialogue can go on, then neither
player is said to win; the game proceeds as long as moves are available. P wins
by making a winning move; in other presentations of dialogue games such as
Fermu¨ller’s [4], P wins when Opponent makes a losing move.
Winning strategies for dialogue games can be used to capture notions of
validity.
Definition 2. For a set S of dialogue rules and a formula ϕ, the relation S ϕ
means that P has an S-winning strategy for ϕ. If 2S ϕ, then we say that ϕ is
S-invalid. D(S) is the set {ϕ : S ϕ}.
Note that, like usual proof-theoretic characterizations of validity, dialogue valid-
ity is an existential notion, unlike the usual model-theoretic notions of validity,
which are universal notions.
We now consider two standard rule sets from the dialogue literature.
Definition 3. The rule set D is comprised of the following structural rules [3,
p. 220]:
(D10) P may assert an atomic formula only after it has been asserted by O before.
0 P p→ (q → p) (initial move)
1 O p [A,0]
2 P q → p [D,1]
3 O q [A,2]
4 P p [D,3]
Table 2. An E-dialogue for p→ (q → p):
0 P p ∨ ¬p (initial move)
1 O ? [A,0]
2 P ¬p [D,1]
3 O p [A,2]
Table 3. An E-dialogue for excluded middle
(D11) When defending, only the most recent open attack (that is, attack against
which no defense has yet been played) may be responded to.
(D12) An attack may be answered at most once.
(D13) A P-assertion may be attacked at most once.
Definition 4. The rule set D+ E is D plus the following rule:
(E) O can react only upon the immediately preceding P-statement.
Definition 5. The rule set CL is E− {D11,D12}.
To give a sense of how these games proceed, let us look at a few concrete examples
of them. In the following, note that we are working with concrete formulas; “p”
and “q” in the following are concrete atomic formulas (atoms) and should not
be read schematically (indeed, if one were to substitute more complex formulas
for p and q in what follows, the examples would become incomplete in the sense
that they no longer necessarily represent wins or losses for P).
Example 1. Let us consider a simple intuitionistic validity, the K-formula. Ta-
ble 2 lays out a concrete game for this formula. This dialogue adheres to the
E-rule because O is always responding to the immediately prior statement of
P. Note that P is permitted to assert the atom p at move 3 because O already
asserted it at move 1. P wins this game: O can make no further moves: the
E-forces O to respond to move 4 (in fact, it must be attacked), but, in light of
the particle rules, attacks on atoms are not permitted.
Example 2. Table 3 treats the classical law of the excluded middle, p∨¬p. This
short E-dialogue (which, incidentally, is also a D-dialogue) leads to a loss for P:
as in the previous example, P is stuck.
Example 3. Returning to excluded middle, let’s see how the game goes when we
change from intuitionistic to classical rules; see Table 4. The difference between
0 P p ∨ ¬p (initial move)
1 O ? [A,0]
2 P ¬p [D,1]
3 O p [A,2]
4 P p [D,1]
Table 4. A CL-dialogue for excluded middle
this dialogue, which P wins, and the previous dialogue, which P lost, is that P
can now return to earlier attacks and defend against them in a new way. The
absence of rule D11 from CL makes the difference.
These examples should serve to give the reader a sense for how dialogue games
proceed, as one varies the rules. Despite their apparent lack of logical meaning,
the rule sets D and E have the following property:
Theorem 1 (Felscher). For all formulas ϕ, the following are equivalent:
– ϕ is intuitionistically valid.
– D ϕ.
– E ϕ.
The proof goes by converting deductions in an intuitionistic sequent calculus to
D-winning strategies (via tableaux), and vice versa. Moreover, the ruleset CL
has the following significance:
Theorem 2 (Felscher). For all formulas ϕ, we have that ϕ is a classical tau-
tology iff CL ϕ.
In other words, dropping D11 and D12 from the ruleset E moves us from intu-
itionistic to classical logic.
3 The composition problem
One can view dialogue games in two (compatible) ways. These games can be a
kind of rational dialogue between two players, or they can be viewed as a kind
of logical calculus. In this section we shall describe a problem about dialogues
that bears on them no matter which view one takes about dialogues.
The statement of the problem does not depend on which viewpoint we adopt:
Problem 1 (Composition) Given a set S of structural rules, determine whether
D(S) is closed under modus ponens, that is, whether it is true that ϕ ∈ D(S)
and ϕ→ ψ ∈ D(S) implies ψ ∈ D(S).
One approach to the composition problem is to simply give positive solutions for
each ruleset S that one is interested in. A more unifying problem is available,
though:
Problem 2 (Uniform composition) Give criteria for a set S of dialogue rules
(perhaps coming from some delimited class of rulesets) such that modus ponens
is admissible for D(S).
Instead of focusing on particular rulesets, the uniform composition problem asks
for criteria for a ruleset which, if satisfied for any ruleset S, ensure that we have
a positive solution to the composition problem for S.
The qualifier “(perhaps coming from some delimited class of rulesets)” in
the statement of the uniform composition problem permits one to restrict the
range of rulesets of interest (e.g., such as those coming from various dialogical
characterizations of modal logic [8]). A totally general solution to the uniform
composition problem seems to be out of the question, putting aside the question
of what a “dialogue rule” in general is, which makes it unclear over what the
problem quantifies.
We now consider this problem from the two points of view about dialogues.
3.1 Dialogues as rational interaction
If dialogues are to be for a (stylized) kind of rational interaction, then one ought
to have a criterion according to which one can say that certain (sets of) dialogue
rules support or undermine the rational behavior of the players.
From results like Felscher’s we can see that there must be a positive solution
to the composition problem: since intuitionistic logic is actually a logic, if P has
winning strategies for ϕ and ϕ → ψ, then P must have a winning strategy for
ψ.
Thus, by singling out the composition problem, we are not necessarily raising
a genuinely new problem about dialogue games, at least not in all cases, where
correspondence results are known, such as for intuitionistic and classical first-
order logic, modal logics, and so forth. Rather, we are proposing a problem with a
change of emphasis: rather than solving the composition problem as a corollary
of considerably stronger results, we raise the following challenge for dialogue
games: if a set of dialogue rules S is supposed to actually be a coherent logic,
we would like to have a direct proof of this fact; it should, ideally, be possible
to give a direct solution of the composition problem for S before a technically
complex correspondence is established between the set of formulas for which P
has a winning strategy and the set of known validities.
Another way to approach the composition problem: if dialogue games based
on a set S of dialogue rules are supposed to be an autonomous foundation for
some kind of logic L, then it should be possible to solve the composition problem
for S without reference to whatever “machinery” for L has been built up outside
of the dialogical approach.
What do we mean by “rational”? Various senses are available, for a ruleset S:
– An S-strategy for a formula ϕ should correspond to some conclusive reason-
ing for ϕ;
– if P has an S-winning strategy for ϕ, then P does not have an S-winning
strategy for ¬ϕ;
– if P has an S-winning strategy for ϕ, then Opponent does not also have an
S-winning strategy for ϕ;
– if P has S-winning strategies for ϕ and ϕ → ψ, then P has an S-winning
strategy for ψ.
The fourth explication of S-strategy rationality is simply the same as the com-
position problem for S.
We can further distinguish two loci of rationality: games and strategies.
Definition 6 (Game rationality). A ruleset S is game-rational if the devel-
opment of S-dialogue games should have the form of a rational conversation
between two opposing players.
Definition 7 (Strategy rationality). A ruleset S is strategy-rational if S-
winning strategies constitute some kind of rational argument.
One way to deflate the composition problem is to acknowledge that dialogue
games are not in fact supposed to be an autonomous foundation of capturing
validity in a logic. (One might even wonder what it means to be an autonomous
foundation for a logic.) Or we are to drop the requirement about game-rationality
or strategy-rationality for dialogue rulesets. And it would seem that neither of
these desiderata can really be abandoned, if one wishes to see dialogue games as
more than a mere calculus and having something to do with “rational dialogue”.
It seems we lack a compelling account of the rationality of dialogues, in the sense
that we lack a defense of certain sets of dialogue rules over others.1 If one views
dialogues as simply alternative calculi for working with different logics, then one
might still be persuaded by our call for “direct” solutions to the composition
problem. This point of view is taken up in the next subsection.
3.2 Dialogues as calculi
Apart from treating dialogue games as a stylized debate or rational interaction
between two opposing players, one can view these games as a logical calculus on
a par with other formalisms for proofs such as Hilbert-style, natural deduction,
tableaux, or sequent calculus. (These two points of view are, of course, compat-
ible.) From this point of view, the composition problem for a ruleset S is the
problem of showing that modus ponens is an admissible rule of inference for
D(S), the set of all formulas ϕ for which P has an S-winning strategy for ϕ.
One way to view the problem is that we have a handful of positive results:
for a certain very limited number of dialogue rulesets, we know about them that
they correspond to certain logics (and hence positively solve their associated
composition problems). We may view these positive results as local maxima in
a space populated by logics and non-logics alike. We wish to understand what
happens when we step away from these local maxima in this space. Certainly,
1 Woods has highlighted another problem concerning the rationality of dialogue games,
different from ours, which is related to the problem of logical omniscience [20]. Wal-
ton also sketches some problems of rationality in dialogues [19].
some curiosities will result (see section 4.1 for an example). The perspective
behind the uniform composition problem is to embrace these non-maxima (or
perhaps even discovering new maxima) in the hopes of understanding the whole
space: let us shift from a (very) discrete point of view to a “continuous” point
of view, to see what the dialogical space is like.
One can evidently point to theorems such as Felscher’s to dispense with the
composition problem for the rulesets D and E. However, Felscher’s theorem does
not, prima facie, solve the uniform composition problem. Some positive results
bearing on the uniform composition problem are those of Fermu¨ller [4], who,
using so-called parallel dialogue games, gives dialogical characterizations of a
variety of intermediate logics. We shall return to Fermu¨ller’s results later, in
section 4.2.
We are also interested in the question of to what extent dialogue games
actually offer a fine-grained division of different kinds of logics. If it turns out
that only a handful of sets of dialogue rules are adequate for the purpose of
generating a logic (i.e., for capturing some minimally rational meaning of a
dialogue game), then this needs to be explained. That is, if it turns out that
there is something unique about the standard sets of dialogue rules that have
heretofore been investigated, then this serves as a critical point for the dialogue
approach, because it shows that its apparent opportunity for logical generality
is in fact highly constrained and tightly delimited.
3.3 Direct solutions to the composition problem
A positive solution to the composition problem for a set of dialogue rules tells us
that our rule set gives rise to a logic, at least in a weak sense of the term “logic”.
Of course, we are likely not interested in the case where all formulas are valid,
in which case the composition problem is trivially solved in the affirmative.
We have indicated that we prefer direct solutions to the composition problem.
We can certainly bring to bear whatever means we have toward establishing
significant properties of a dialogical logic. But if a “direct” solution to a problem
is available, it seems reasonable to provide one alongside whatever other methods
we have. The problem is simply that we wish to have multiple proofs. Whether
a direct proof that operates on winning strategies is “the same” as a proof
of the same result using some other methods is not always clear. Even if a
positive solution to the composition problem is “really” a disguised version of
cut elimination, there may still be value in working directly with strategies rather
with, say, sequent calculi derivations, since we don’t need to first do the work of
showing that the sequent calculi really captures the strategies.
Direct solutions to dialogical problems may be the only solutions, if one
is exploring a logic whose relation to other, differently characterized logics is
unknown. A positive, direct solution to the composition problem for such a logic
is given in [1] (see also Section 4).
To illustrate further what we have in mind by “direct” solutions to dialogical
problems, we now give a positive solution to the composition problem for a
dialogical characterization of classical propositional logic. We will first present
a set CL of dialogue rules, and then we will show that CL ϕ→ ψ and CL ϕ
implies CL ψ by working with CL-winning strategies. We will not show that
CL captures CL; see [3].
Lemma 1. No atom is CL-valid.
Proof. The CL does not permit a game to even get started with the assertion
by P of an atom.
Such a result obviously holds for any set of dialogue rules that contains D10.
The next lemma is a kind of consistency result of classical logic, construed
dialogically.
Lemma 2 (No explosion). There is no CL-valid formula ϕ with the property
that CL ϕ→ ψ for all formulas ψ.
Such a formula gives rise to an “explosion” in the sense that it entails (in the
object language) all formulas. If there were such a formula ϕ, we would have,
for example, that CL ϕ→ p, even for atoms p that do not occur in ϕ. Such a
case is clearly untenable. We have not yet been able to find a direct proof of this
lemma, but it does seem to us to be an important step toward a direct proof of the
composition problem for CL. (Note that, by closure of CL-valid formulas under
modus ponens, such an “explosion” formula does not exist, since it would imply,
as we said, that all atoms would be valid, which of course violates Lemma 1.)
Such a problem can clearly be solved quite easily using the truth table notion of
classical validity. Less easy is a proof-theoretic solution to the problem using a
sequent calculi adequate for classical logic; the solution apparently requires cut
elimination.
Theorem 3 (Attack-first). If CL ϕ, then there is a CL-winning strategy for
ϕ in which P’s defenses are delayed as far as possible.
Proof. The idea is that we consider CL-winning strategies τ that have the prop-
erty that, for each branch b of τ , and each P move m of b, if m is a defense,
then at m it is not possible for P to attack. That is, we consider CL-winning
strategies where P must defend; if P can attack, then he does.
The existence of such CL-winning strategies is clear. If there is a CL-winning
strategy for ϕ, but only one, then it satisfies the attack-first condition because
P has no alternatives available to him. For a CL-valid formula ϕ, there could
even be multiple such strategies.
We can refine the attack-first strategy further by requiring that, if no attacks
but multiple defenses are available for P, then we require that P defend against
the most recent attack.
Theorem 4 (Attack-first-defend-most-recent). IF CL ϕ, then there exists
a CL-winning strategy in which P’s defenses are delayed as far as possible, and
in which, if multiple defenses are possible for P, then the defense against the
most recent attack is chosen.
0 P ϕ → ψ (initial move)
1 O ϕ [A,0]
Table 5. Beginning of every CL-winning strategy for ϕ → ψ
The existence of such strategies for CL-valid formulas is again clear.
Note that, unlike proofs of analogous results via cut elimination, these “nor-
mal forms” for dialogues do not require the definition of a reduction relation and
a proof that it is normalizing; the existence of CL-winning strategies adhering
to these conditions is clear.
We have so far not been able to find a “direct” proof of Lemma 2. Such a
result must hold, since, thanks to Felscher’s and other dialogical characterization
of classical logic (e.g., [16]), we have CL ϕ iff ϕ is a classical tautology. From
the perspective of truth tables, such a statement clearly holds: a ϕ with this
property would be a contradiction such as ⊥ or p∧¬p, but such statements are
not valid. The following is an outline of a proof using “direct” methods, using
the ideas developed so far.
Theorem 5. If CL ϕ and CL ϕ→ ψ, then CL ψ.
Proof (Sketch). Consider a CL-winning strategy d for ϕ→ ψ. It begins with the
assertion by P of ϕ → ψ, then an attack by O on this implication, asserting
ϕ. The beginning is shown in Table 5. We do not know what the next step is;
P could attack ϕ or defend against the initial assertion of ψ. There are three
possibilities:
– P never defends against the initial attack on ϕ→ ψ. In this case, evidently
it makes no difference what ψ is, so by simply changing the first step of d
from ϕ→ ψ to ϕ→ χ, we have a CL-winning strategy for ϕ→ ψ, no matter
what ψ is. ϕ would thus a counterexample to Lemma 2.
– P never attacksO’s assertion of ϕ. Then d is evidently already a CL-winning
strategy for ψ, provided we simply delete the initial two moves.
– P does defend against the initial attack on ϕ→ ψ. This is the general case,
and likely the most difficult. The main idea is to look for a suitable rewriting,
or normal form, of the strategy into one from which we can extract a CL-
winning strategy for ϕ→ ψ. It seems plausible that the defend last normal
form defined earlier would be helpful. By adhering to that normal form, we
defer P’s defense against the initial attack as long as possible, forcing O
to make the greatest number of commitments (viz., assert the most atoms)
before coming to the defense against the initial attack.
We have targeted CL here and a dialogical characterization (CL) of it because
CL is somewhat relaxed compared to the rulesets D and E, which are known to
be adequate for intuitionistic logic. That IL is closed under modus ponens is, of
course, obvious. It is not clear to us whether the strategy normal forms that we
have proposed (namely, the attack-first and its refinement, attack-first-defend-
latest forms) have the same significance in the presence of rules D11 and D12
as they do when these two rules are missing (which is the case for the standard
dialogical characterization of CL).
4 Varying dialogue rules
To illustrate our approach, let us look at some examples where one varies the
rulesets. This section reports on three such experiments.
4.1 Nearly classical logic
We have stated earlier that Felscher’s theorem shows the correspondence between
the D and E rulesets and intuitionistic logic IL. Since IL is closed under modus
ponens, Felscher’s theorem implies that D(D) and D(E) are likewise both closed
under modus ponens. It is also known that, if one drops Felscher’s D11 and D12
from D, but adds rule E, one obtains a dialogical characterization of classical
logic CL.
Is rule E necessary for modus ponens?
Definition 8. Let N be D−{D11,D12}, and let N be the set of N-valid formulas.
Since dropping the E makes no difference when passing from E to D, it is
true that closure under modus ponens is preserved if one drops E from D −
{D11,D12} ∪ {E} (which dialogically captures CL)? More simply, is N closed
under modus ponens?
The answer, curiously, is that N is closed under modus ponens but not un-
der uniform substitution. The following necessary conditions govern N’s valid
implications:
Theorem 6. If N ϕ→ ψ, then either
1. N ψ,
2. ϕ is atomic, or
3. ϕ is a negation.
(For details, see [1].) Using Theorem 6, many failures of uniform substitution for
N can be produced. We have, for example, that N p→ ¬¬p (this can be shown
by calculation), but 2N (p ∧ p)→ ¬¬(p ∧ p), because the antecedent meets none
of the necessary conditions listed in Theorem 6. (That 2N ¬¬(p ∧ p) can be
shown by calculation.)
Adding rule E to N restores uniform substitution (and maintains closure
under modus ponens), so despite appearances, there must be something about
rule E intimately tied to uniform substitution.
The presence of the E could be regarded as a mere technical necessity for es-
tablishing a correspondence between existence of winning strategies for dialogue
games and some notion of logical validity, characterized without using dialogues.
The E rule has no obvious correspondence with everyday dialogue; even if one
were inclined to adopt some kind of regimentation, the E appears to be a rather
strong constraint. A better understanding of its eliminability is wanted. Results
such as the curious N show that, at least in one well-known setting (classical
dialogue games), E cannot be entirely dropped, while in at least one other set-
ting (intuitionistic logic) it can be dropped. One problem would be to find some
relaxation of E that suffices for CL. It seems fruitful us to investigate the precise
conditions under which repetitions are permitted. Already some work has been
done in this direction (see [9]) for intuitionistic logic.
4.2 An attempted dialogical characterization of the logic LQ
In a Hilbert-style calculus for propositional logic, one can start with intuitionistic
logic and obtains classical logic by adding additional axioms, such as Peirce’s
formula, excluded middle, or double negation elimination (the precise details
depend on which propositional signature one is interested in).
With dialogues, one moves from intuitionistic to classical logic not by adding
but by removing dialogue rules. In the dialogical setting, classical logic can be
obtained by relaxing the dialogue rules for intuitionistic logic.2 One might then
naturally wonder if one can give dialogical characterizations of intermediate log-
ics (i.e., propositional logics between IL and CL) by adding dialogue rules to the
ruleset CL.
One natural experiment would be to try to capture a “simple” intermediate
logic, such as Jankov’s logic LQ [7,17], which is IL together with the principle of
weak excluded middle (WEM), ¬p ∨ ¬¬p. This principle is obviously classically
valid but it is independent of IL (one can see this using Kripke models).
Fermu¨ller has given a dialogical characterization of LQ (and other logics) with
the help of parallel dialogue games [4]. Fermu¨ller matches winning strategies for
parallel dialogue games with derivability in a calculus based on hypersequents
due to Ciabattoni et al. [2]. Fermu¨ller’s parallel dialogue games diverge from the
“sequential” games employed in this paper.
Despite Fermu¨ller’s solution, one might still seek out a “sequential” char-
acterization of LQ, perhaps employing a non-hypersequent formulation of LQ,
such as Hosoi’s [6]. Ideally, one would seek an intuitive, self-contained addition or
modification to some known ruleset, such as the E, that would characterize LQ.
A first step would be to find such a modification according to which ¬p ∨ ¬¬p
is valid.
To motivate the new dialogue rule that will be introduced soon, let us consider
the E-dialogue game for WEM; see Table 6. The two E-dialogues for ¬p ∨ ¬¬p
of Table 6 show that P loses quickly no matter whether the initial attack is
defended by asserting ¬p or ¬¬p. Since WEM is not intuitionistically valid, by
Felscher’s theorem P does not have an E-winning strategy for it. Indeed, the
2 The precise claim is that one can obtain a dialogical characterization of classical
logic by removing D11 and D12 from the ruleset E. We say “can be obtained” rather
than “is obtained” because, depending on which ruleset one chooses for intuitionistic
logic, our claim is false: the ruleset N and the set N that it generates shows that we
do not obtain classical logic by simply dropping D11 and D12 from the ruleset D.
0 P ¬p ∨ ¬¬p (initial move)
1 O ? [A,0]
2 P ¬p [D,1]
3 O p [A,2]
0 P ¬p ∨ ¬¬p (initial move)
1 O ? [A,0]
2 P ¬¬p [D,1]
3 O ¬p [A,2]
Table 6. Two losing plays for P in the E-dialogue for weak excluded middle
0 P ¬p ∨ ¬¬p (initial move)
1 O ? [A,0]
2 P ¬p [D,1]
3 O p [A,2]
4 P ¬¬p [D,1]
5 O ¬p [A,4]
6 P p [A,5]
Table 7. A winning play for P in the CL-dialogue for weak excluded middle
above two games, diverging at move 2, together make up all possible ways the
game could go; P loses in both. The obstacle seems to be D10, which blocks P
from asserting the atom p before Opponent has conceded it. We can see this by
comparing the two E-dialogues with how the game goes when playing the ruleset
CL for classical logic. In the ruleset CL, P can return to earlier attack and defend
against them, unlike in the D and E rulesets, in which multiple defenses are ruled
out. P’s ability to repeat earlier defenses makes all the difference, because he
can defend in move 4, in a different way, using O’s “concession” of the atom p
in move 3. (The game of Table 7 is in fact a winning strategy for WEM.)
We require a set S of dialogue rules “between” the ruleset E and CL. P’s
ability to return to earlier defenses seems to be rather too strong. Let us consider
the following modified form of D10:
(D10∗) P may assert an atom p only if O has asserted either p or ¬p before.
Let E∗ be E except with D10∗ instead of D10. The idea is that WEM is a kind
of excluded middle, but only for negative statements. We modify D10 according
to this intuition: once O reveals some negative information (i.e., concedes a
negated atom), P is permitted to proceed with this information as though it
were positive. Table 8 is a calculation showing that at least one instance of
E∗ WEM is valid, and proceeds in an intuitive way (from the perspective of
LQ): But this rule goes overboard: we have not captured LQ but something else,
because the formula ¬p → p is E∗-valid. This can easily be seen: O’s unique
opening move is to assert ¬p, and now P has a unique response: to assert p,
winning the game.
The lesson of this failure to capture the logic LQ using dialogues is that we
had a well-motivated modification to a basic dialogue rule, but the consequences
of adopting this rule were that unacceptable formulas became valid. Ideally, we
would be able to appeal to a structure theory that would explain the precise
0 P ¬p ∨ ¬¬p (initial move)
1 O ? [A,0]
2 P ¬¬p [D,1]
3 O ¬p [A,2]
4 P p [A,3]
Table 8. A winning play for P in the E∗-dialogue for weak excluded middle
0 P ¬¬p→ p (initial move)
1 O ¬¬p [A,0]
2 P ¬p [A,1]
3 O p [A,2]
Table 9. A non-winning play for P in the D-dialogue for the stability principle
force of rule D10, which would inform us “in advance” of what would happen if
we were to modify (or drop) it.
4.3 Characterizing stable logic dialogically
Stable logic S is the intermediate logic axiomatized by the stability principle
¬¬p→ p
for atoms p. The stability principle is not provable in intuitionistic logic.
This is intuitively clear by considering the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov inter-
pretation, but it may be definitively shown by, e.g., a suitable Kripke model.
Although it has the flavor of being “inherently classical”, stable logic is in fact
strictly weaker than classical logic. To obtain classical logic, it suffices to add the
stability principle to Jankov’s LQ discussed in Section 4.2. From the standpoint
of the program considered in this paper, it is natural to ask how one can give
a dialogical characterization of stable logic. We found in Section 4.2 that, when
we translated our semantic intuition of the principle of weak excluded middle
into the dialogical context, the naive attempt failed. In the case of stable logic,
though, one’s semantic intuition can be easily expressed dialogically.
To get started, let us consider, from the dialogical perspective, why stability
is not provable. Let us take the D rules; see Table 9. The game can develop in
only one way. P would like to assert p, and since O has also asserted it (move 3),
so rule D10 wouldn’t be violated. P cannot because he cannot defend against
the
Already in IL, one can prove p→ ¬¬p. Adding the stability principle, we have
p↔ ¬¬p, so p and ¬¬p are, as it were, on a par with one another. Consider now
the following new structural rule:
(D10′) P may assert an atom p only if O has asserted either p or ¬¬p before.
m O ¬¬p [-,-]
...
n P p [-,-]
This is reminiscent of our failed dialogical characterization of Jankov’s LQ
using D10∗. Here, though, instead of “semantically identifying” p and ¬p (which,
in hindsight, is the root of the failure), we semantically identify p and its double
negation ¬¬p. Referring to the non-winning play in Table 9, it is clear that, were
D10′ in effect rather than D10, the game would be “short-circuited” because,
once O asserts ¬¬p, P can pounce and assert p in defense of the initial attack;
O then cannot reply.
Of course, it is quite possible that, these positive signs notwithstanding, the
adoption of our modified D10 has unacceptable consequences, as we saw in the
preceding section when ¬p→ p became dialogically valid.
Interestingly, the motivation behind the formalization of stable logic as pre-
sented in Negri and von Plato [13] is to give a sequent characterization of the
familiar principle of indirect proof (“if from ¬p one can derive a contradiction,
then p is provable”), here the principle is, roughly, the “semantic identification”
of p and ¬¬p.
Definition 9. Let E′ be the set of E \ {D10} ∪ {D10′}-valid formulas.
The aim is to show that E′ equals S. We are so far able to show part of this
(see Theorem 7). The following lemmas show that our proposal stands a chance
of dialogically capturing S.
Lemma 3. If ϕ is E′, then there exist atoms p1, . . . , pn in ϕ such that

 ∧
1≤i≤n
¬¬pi → pi

→ ϕ
belongs to IL.
Proof. A move in dialogue games is not labeled by what rule justifies the move
(unlike, say, sequent calculi or natural deduction). The idea is that all structural
rules govern all moves. Nonetheless, let us nonetheless call an “application” of
D10′ a move by P that would be impossible if the standard D10 were in effect
rather than D10′. Applications of D10′ thus look, schematically, like this: The
idea is, for each application of D10′, to adjust the strategy—in fact, even the
initial statement by P—so that these applications are “eliminated” in the sense
that the same sequence of moves goes through if D10′ were replaced the more
strict D10. Such rewrites are effected as follows:
– Before the initial statement of ϕ by P, insert the following moves: (Of course,
the addition of new moves to the beginning of the game needs to be accom-
panied by relabeling any references. Thus, a reference to move 3 should now
refer to move 7, etc.)
0 P (¬¬p→ p) → ϕ (initial move)
1 O ¬¬p → p [A,0]
2 P ¬¬p [A,1]
3 O ¬p [A,2]
4 O ϕ [D,1]
...
Table 10. Eliminating an application of D10′ by explicitly postulating an instance of
stability
m O ¬¬p [-,-]
...
n P ¬p [A,m]
n+ 1 O p [A,n]
n+ 2 P p [D,1]
Table 11. Eliminating an application of D10′
– Replace the application of D10′ as in Table 11:
– Repeat until there are no more applications of D10′.
The effect of these repeated rewrites is that any “exploit” by P of the extra
freedom granted by the relaxed D10′ gets turned into an extra
The atoms claimed to exist in Lemma 3 come from the winning strategy that
witnesses that ϕ ∈ E′. It may be possible that, depending on the strategy, we
get a different set of atoms. In any case, adding stability for more atoms can’t
hurt (weakening is clearly acceptable).
Lemma 4. If ϕ ∈ E′, then

 ∧
1≤i≤n
¬¬pi → pi

→ ϕ
belongs to IL, where p1, . . . , pn lists all the atoms occurring in ϕ.
Lemma 4 gives a dialogical characterization of a familiar fact about stable
logic (see, e.g., [18, Ch. 3]), namely that one can “reduce” some intermediate
logics to IL provided one explicitly postulates salient features of the intermediate
logic (for the case of LQ, see Hosoi [6], where the fact that explicitly postulate
instances of the principle of weak excluded middle, playing the same role there
as the stability principle does for us here). Lemma 4 combined with the fact that
stable logic includes all instances of the stability principle yields:
Lemma 5. If 
 ∧
1≤i≤n
¬¬pi → pi

→ ϕ
is in IL, then ϕ ∈ S.
Lemmas 3 and 5 yield:
Theorem 7. If ϕ ∈ E′, then ϕ ∈ S.
Evidently, if ϕ ∈ IL, then ϕ ∈ E′ (the extra freedom of D10′ granted to P
compared to D10 need not be exercised). Moreover, all instances of the stability
scheme are, by construction, in E′, so E′ properly extends IL.
We have so far not be able to problem of showing the converse of Theorem 7,
but we conjecture that our proposed characterization of S is indeed correct. To
complete the proof that E′ is S, it would suffice to show that (i) E′ is closed
under modus ponens, and (ii) E′ is closed under uniform substitution. (Such
an approach is grounded on a Hilbert-style approach to stable logic.) Another
route would be to try to go in the opposite direction taken in the proof of
Lemma 3. There, we defined the notion of “application” of D10′ and showed how
to eliminate them by explicitly postulating instances of the stability principle
and manipulating the way the winning strategy starts. Ideally, one would want
to go the other way: show how, from an E-winning strategy for

 ∧
1≤i≤n
¬¬pi → pi

→ ϕ,
to construct a D10∗-winning strategy for ϕ alone by introducing (rather than
eliminating) what we have called applications of D10∗. The chief difficulty is to
characterize the possible ways that a stability hypothesis ¬¬p→ p is used.
4.4 Independent rulesets
Felscher indicates that rule E implies D13 and, for odd positions, D11 and D12,
too. This means that every dialogue that adheres to rule E also adheres to D13,
and if we understand D11 and D12 as quantifying over move positions 0, 1, . . . ,
then every dialogue that adheres to the E also adheres to D11 and D12 if the
quantifiers in these rules are restricted to odd numbers.
The fact that standard dialogue rules can imply each other, wholly or par-
tially, is an obstacle for solving the composition problem for subsets of standard
rulesets. What we would seek are independent sets of dialogue rules, that is, sets
of rules each member of which is not implied by the others.
The examples above of N and the failed dialogical characterization of LQ
demonstrate the sensitive dependence of D(S) on a set S of dialogue rules.
Slight changes to a set S of dialogue rules can cause D(S) to shift from being
a familiar logic to a curiosity like N or the result of the failed characterization
of LQ (which may not even be a logic at all, in the sense of not being closed
under modus ponens) On the other hand, sometimes simple semantic intuitions
do apparently lead to success, as in the case of stable logic in Section 4.3.
The demonstrated sensitivity may turn out to be an intrinsic feature of the
dialogical approach. Moreover, sensitivity can be found outside dialogues, too:
one can jump from intuitionistic to classical logic in a Hilbert-style calculus—an
enormous leap, from the point of view of the lattice of intermediate logics—in
a single step by adding a single new axiom (e.g., excluded middle or Peirce’s
formula). And one can move from intuitionistic to classical logic by simply drop-
ping a constraint on the number of formulas that can appear on the right-hand
side of a sequent.3
Nonetheless, the non-independence of standard sets of dialogue rules is an
obstacle to solving both the uniform and non-uniform composition problems.
From a foundation of an independent set of dialogue rules, the problem of ex-
posing some structure becomes easier because we can gradually add or subtract
rules with the confidence that we are not making impermissible “jumps” in the
space of possibilities.
5 Conclusion
Dialogue games can be viewed either as a stylized form of rational interaction
or as alternative logical calculi. We have raised two problems—the modus po-
nens problem and the uniform substitution problem—that, on either view, pose
challenges for the dialogician that are, so far, largely unaddressed. It seems that
today much remains to be done for dialogues to give them their proper proof-
theoretic foundation. We have argued, more precisely, that one important gap is
that we lack a structure theory for dialogues that could help shed light on the
problem of precisely what is the force of various dialogue rules.
We are not able to give a precise characterization of “direct” solutions to
problems in dialogical logic. We gave a few results and conjectures (see, e.g.,
Lemma 2) along the intended lines. we in fact do not yet possess a direct solution.
We left open the problem of showing, directly, that classical propositional logic
is consistent, in the sense that there is no CL-valid formula ϕ such that CL ϕ
but satisfies CL ϕ→ ψ for all formulas ψ. It seems plausible to us that a direct
solution to the problem is available; the solution may go via a normal form
theorem for dialogue games.
One reason behind our preference for direct solutions to problems in dialogical
logic is to stimulate the development of the dialogue formalism so that it becomes
more systematic. In our view, resorting to external devices to establish basic
results in dialogical logic is not a vote of confidence for dialogues, but is implicitly
a concession that the formalism is awkward and difficult to work with.
3 The claim here is not that all Hilbert-style and sequent calculi for intuitionistic
logic are such that adding one new principle or dropping exactly one structural
condition are sufficient to capture classical logic; there are precise calculi for which
these claims hold. A concrete example of a suitable Hilbert-style calculus is provided
by the axioms B, C, K, and I , with Peirce’s formula [15]; the calculus G2 [18] is a
suitable example of a sequent calculus.
Returning to the non-winning play that motivated our investigation (see
Table 9, another option for proceeding would be to drop rule D11 but keep the
other rules. This opens the door to P having a winning strategy, but it is not clear
what the logical characterization is. More precisely: A known characterization
of CL is the E minus rules D11 and D12; it is possible that dropping D11, but
keeping D12, gives us stable logic or at least a logic in which stability is provable.
We leave this as an open problem. We also leave open the problem of showing
that E′ is closed under uniform substitution and modus ponens. Solving both of
these two problems would, combined with our soundness result, entail that the
simple modification we made to the structural rules for intuitionistic logic do
indeed yield stable logic.
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